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INTRODUCTION
An important problem in the study of attitudes is how

attitudes are acquired.

One approach is that of applying

the principles of learning theory to attitude formation.
It is generally agreed that most,

are learned.

if

not all, attitudes

Perhaps one's attitude toward sweetness in

general is physiologically determined, but certainly one's

reactions to most attitude objects are not innate.

So if

attitude acquisition can be placed within the broad conceptual framework of learning theory, what is the mechanism

involved?

An attempt to answer this question has been ad-

vanced by Staats and Staats (1957, 1958) in terms of

a

classical conditioning model of attitude formation.

Cer-

tainly, this approach is only one of many possible concep-

tualizations within the learning framework.

interpretations of their data rely on

a

Alternative

more cognitive

problem-solving explanation (Cohen, 1964; Page, 1969).
Staats and Staats (1957) have extended the thought of
such psychologists as Cofer and Foley (1942), Mowrer (1954)
and Osgood (1952)
of meaning.

in a study of

the classical conditioning

Following Osgood, they view meaning as an im-

plicit detachable component of the total response to an
object.

That is, meaning is one part of the response to an

object, and like any other response, can be classically

conditioned.

Words can be considered the signs of objects,

3

and they elicit a part of the total response to the object

itself.
a

word.

Affective meaning is

a

portion of the response to

Staats and Staats theorize that if meaning is

detachable response elicited by

a

a

word, then it should be

possible for the meaning response to be classically conditioned to any continuously presented stimulus.

sense syllable followed by

a

So

a

non-

word should be slightly con-

ditioned by the meaning component of the word.

For example,

YOF followed by the word "happiness" would result in the

meaning of happiness being weakly conditioned to YOF.
Since a single pairing may not result in empirically measurable conditioning, Staats and Staats felt multiple pairings would be necessary to obtain strong conditioning.

These multiple pairings could not be with the same word,
since direct association of the word and syllable could
then explain the results.

Instead, different words with the

same or similar meaning components can be used, since these

common components will strengthen conditioning, while the
other components of the meaning response will differ and,

according to Staats, actually inhibit each other.

Thus,

YOF could be consecutively paired with happiness, pretty,
and sweet (Figure 1).

The initial pairing would result

in YOF being conditioned weakly to r pv

(the positive

value meaning response to happiness), and

(all

components of the meaning response to happiness).
cond pairing resul'cs in the

r

the other

The se-

bond being strengthenea

4

since it has occurred twice, and the

R

responses tend to

p

weaken the R^ bond*

The third pairing results in further

strengthening of the

r

bit R

H

and R

p

.

pv bond and again R s serves to inhi-

This assumes that

R

R

,

R

p

,

systematic meaning components in common.
is that YOF is conditioned to elicit r

Insert Figure

1

Pv

and R

g

have no

The net result
.

about here

To test this hypothesis, Staats and Staats (1957) designed the following experimental procedure, which has been
used in most subsequent studies.

The conditioned stimuli

were six nonsense syllables, and the unconditioned stimuli
were words possessing
is

,

a

common evaluative meaning.

That

the unconditioned stimul i words were all of either

positive or negative evaluative meaning.

A number of filler

words were also employed in the procedure which were of neutral evaluative meaning.

One syllable was always paired

with words of positive evaluative meaning, one with words
of negative evaluative meaning, and the remaining four were

paired with words of neutral or unsystematic meaning.

were 108 trials, 18 for each nonsense syllable.
were arranged unsystematical ly

,

There

The trials

except that no nonsense

syllable appeared in more than two consecutive trials.

Subjects were told they were engaged in two simultaneous learning tasks

,

visual and auditory.

That is

,

they

s

Figure

1

Conditioning of Meanirg (from Staats and Staats, 1957)

were given

a

visual learning task, followed by an
auditory

learning task.

During the actual conditioning phase,
the

nonsense syllables were projected onto

a

screen by means of

slide projector, and the words were presented
orally by
the experimenter one second after the slide
appeared on

a

the

screen.

Subjects were instructed to repeat the word aloud

and then to continue to repeat the word silently
to them-

selves.

When the conditioning was completed, the subjects

were asked to write down all the syllables they
recalled
and to rate the syllables on a pleasant-unpleasant
semantic

differential scale.

Awareness of the relation between the

syllables and the words (contingency awareness) was assessed
by asking the subjects to "write down anything you thought

about the experiment, especially anything you thought about
the purpose of the experiment while you were participating
in the experiment."

Subjects indicating contingency aware-

ness were excluded from the analysis.

Nine of 86 subjects

were classified as aware on the basis of the postexperimental

question and were removed before the data was analyzed.
Staats and Staats based their conditioning of meaning
on Osgood and Suci's (1955;

in Staats and Staats,

on the components of meaning.

1957) work

Osgood and Suci found that a

large part of the variance in the judgment of meaning could
be accounted for by three factors:

evaluation (good-bad),

potency (strong-weak), and activity (active-passive).

In

this study, these three components of meaning were separately

7

conditioned to three experimental groups.

Significant con-

ditioning of evaluative meaning was found

(

£<

.001), as

well as for activity and potency.

Staats and his colleagues have since replicated
and extended this work in the classical conditioning
of attitudes.
Nonsense syllables were chosen in the original
study since
they are presumably devoid of significant
meaning, and would
hence be easier to condition.
Staats and Staats

(1958) also

carried out the evaluative conditioning paradigm
described
above with men's names or national names as the
conditioned
stimuli.

Of the 93 subjects run, 17 were found to be aware

of either or both of the systematic name-word
relationships
and were excluded from the analysis.

Results for men's

names showed a significant effect for conditioned attitude

(£< .01), and the difference for national names was also
significant <£<.05).

The implication of interest here is

that if Staats is correct in his interpretation of these re-

sults as unaware learning of an attitude response, then his

conditioning procedure must be fairly powerful to alter established attitudes as in the case of national names.

While

nonsense syllables can be expected to be fairly malleable
in evaluative meaning,

it is perhaps surprising that a few

massed trials can significantly change an attitude presumably
fairly stable.
A study by Staats and Staats (1959)

this problem.

is of relevance for

They studied the effect of the number of

s

conditioning trials on evaluative conditioning of nonsense
syllables and found that as few as eight trials resulted in

significant conditioning (p_<.05).
Staats, Staats and Heard (1959) found significant se-

mantic generalization of meaning of two evaluatively conditioned words to their synonyms.

The words carpet and

rock were conditioned, and then subjects rated their synonyms

rug and stone on the semantic differential scale.

Only two

of 163 subjects were aware that pleasant or unpleasant words

were systematically paired with carpet and rock, and none
were aware of the synonym relationship.

alization of conditioned meaning of

a

Significant gener-

word to

a

word of

similar meaning was found.
All the above research involves higher-order conditioning, since words themselves are presumably conditioned in

meaning.

The first-order conditioning of evaluative mean-

ing to a nonsense syllable, and the accompanying GSR con-

ditioning, was assessed by Staats, Staats and Crawford
(1962).

For this study, shock and loud noise served as

the unconditioned stimuli (UCS).

For purposes of later

analysis, it is necessary to discuss the procedure in some
detail.

The verbal stimuli were the conditioned stimulus

(CS), a generalization of meaning test word, and 23 filler

words.

"Large" was the CS

generalization.

,

and "big" was used to test for

A random list of 77 words was used with

"large" presented .4 times, "big" once, and the rest filler

9

words.

The subject was told that the experiment concerned

the effect of shock and noise as distractors in
task.

a

learning

The CS was followed by a shock or noise on nine of

the 14 presentations of the CS

,

while in the control group

the UCS were also presented nine times, but always after a

filler word.

The control group can thus be viewed as an

explicitly unpaired control (Rescorla, 1967).

Following

the conditioning procedure, subjects were given the semantic

differential to rate six of the words including the CS -and

generalization words.

A f our-guestion apparently oral in-

terview was then conducted to assess awareness, which included the question "Did you anticipate the sound or shock
in any way?"
21

Cf the 28 subjects in the experimental group,

were aware that

"1

arge" was often followed by a noxious

stimulus, but only two saw any relation of this to the semantic differential rating.

It is not explicitly stated that

no subjects were excluded from any of the analyses performed

because of some degree of awareness, but it appears that
none were.

Significant GSR conditioning was found for the

CS (jd^.01), although not for the generalization word.

The

CS was also rated more unpleasant than the neutral words
(p_<.0005), but again no generalization occurred to the

synonym.

This study is open to criticism on several grounds.
First, the CS is presented 14 times while the other words

apparently appeared only

2

or

3

times.

This alone distin-

10

guishes the CS from the filler words and therefore may
in-

crease contingency awareness.

Secondly, the use of the

explicitly unpaired control design may also elicit greater
awareness.

Only the CS is followed by noxious stimuli;

and if one is attending to the repeated CS

,

it is relatively

easy to discern the connection between the CS and the UCS.
Of course, Staats found

2-1

of 28 subjects to be contingency

aware, although not aware of the connection between the con-

tingency and the rating of the semantic differential.

This

type of awareness, awareness of the experimental hypothesis,
has been labeled demand awareness (Orne, 1962).

Demand

awareness in this case implies contingency awareness, since
one must know the contingency in order to understand its

relation to the rating scale.
Here it is not clear if the higher rate of awareness is
not also due to the more extensive questions following the

experiment as well as the experimental procedure itself.
An alternative interpretation of the GSR data is that it

can also be explained in terms of cognitive processes rather
than classical conditioning.

That is, since most subjects

were aware of the relation between the CS and the noxious
stimuli, it is not surprising that the presentation of

stimulus that signals

a

a

shock or loud noise may induce

anxiety or fear or thoughts resulting in greater arousal.
Some researchers view GSR conditioning as ccgnitively

determined (Baer and Fuhrer, 1968; Baer and Fuhrer, 1970),

11

while others stress the role of cognition in the
conditioning (Grings, 1973).

So the presentation of the CS may in no way elicit

a

simple involuntary response, but instead may elicit thoughts
of the impending aversive stimuli.

It would have been of

interest to have the GSR data analyzed separately for aware
and unaware subjects, but this was not done.

This explana-

tion is consistent with both the contingency aware and the

demand aware positions, to be more fully explicated below.
Perhaps this cognitively mediated model can still be con-

sidered classical conditioning, but it is not what Staats

intended in explaining his results.

If the response is

cognitively mediated, it is not unexpected that no generalization will occur to

a

word of similar meaning.

An inter-

esting test would have been to tell subjects that "large"

would no longer be followed by noxious stimuli, but that
another word would.

An immediate shift of the GSR response

may have occurred, as was found by Wilson (1968, in Grings)
in a similar GSR conditioning task.

Cohen (1964) investigated the possible role of contingency awareness in being responsible for the conditioning
by replicating Staats and Staats' procedure, with the following differences.

The experimental group scaled on the seman-

tic differential the six nonsense syllables and also three

that were not presented previously, and a control group

scaled all nine syllables without undergoing the conditioning

.

12

procedure.

Results showed a "general tendency to rate all

six syllables used in the conditioning procedure towards
the pleasant end of the scale.'

control group.

1

This was not true for the

This result could conceivably be due to a

familiarity effect (Zajonc, 1968).

Of the two conditioned

syllables, YOF was consistently rated more pleasant than
XEH, probably due to pronounciability (Underwood and

Schultz, 1960).

A modified form of Staats and Staats'

awareness question was used, as subjects were asked to "write
down anything you thought about the experiment, especially

anything you thought about the purpose of the experiment"
(Staats, 1969).

awareness
aware)

t

(1

Using

or more of

loose criterion of contingency

a
3

judges classifying a subject as

Cohen found 45 subjects unaware of the contingencies

and 52 subjects aware.

This is

a

much higher rate than

Staats and Staats usually obtain, yet
and Staats'

a

comparison of Staats

(1957) overall ratings (without aware subjects)

and Cohen's ratings (with aware subjects) showed great simi-

larity.

Cohen found

subjects

(p_<

highly

significant conditioning for all

.001), but no effect when aware subjects were

removed

Insko and Oakes (1966) manipulated four independent

variables in an investigation of the role of awareness in
the classical conditioning of attitudes.

These were evalua-

tion (positive or negative conditioning), color naming (present or absent), percentage of reinforcement (50 or 100)

13

and extinction trials (0, 15, or 30).

They examined both

contingency awareness and demand awareness.

Instead of

using the Staats and Staats procedure, subjects were
run

individually, with only three nonsense syllables used.

Color naming between trials was used to interfere with contingency awareness, but presumably not conditioning for half
the subjects.

Contingency awareness was assessed through

a

seven-question scale, with an eighth direct question assessing awareness of the demand characteristics.

The major

findings were that conditioning was significantly correlated

with both contingency and demand awareness for the no-color
naming group, but only for the contingency aware in the

color-naming group (p_<.01).

Subjects unaware of the con-

tingency did not condition, but subjects unaware of the demand characteristics did condition.

Insko and Oakes thus

interpret their results in terms of contingency awareness
rather than unaware conditioning or demand awareness.

Aware

ness of the contingency causes the subject to see the CS as

symbolic of a concept.

In this case, for example, YOF may

come to stand for the concept good or pleasant, so subjects
are not just cooperating in rating YOF pleasant.

Oakes see this rating as representing

a

Insko and

cognitive change in

symbolic reference to affect, not in an actual affective
change.
Page (1969) hypothesized that the Staats and Staats

conditioning phenor.ienon was purely

a

function of demand

14

awareness.

According to his interpretation, the subjects

became aware of the contingency between the syllables and
the words.

Then utilizing cues provided in the experiment

such as the association patterns and being asked to rate
the syllables on a pleasant-unpleasant semantic differential

scale, they became aware of the experimenter's hypothesis
or, at least, aware of what the experimenter wanted them to
do.

Most such subjects then cooperated and rated the syll-

ables very strongly in the correct direction.
lated three variables in

procedure.

a

Page manipu-

replication of Staats and Staats'

Psychological sophistication of subjects (begin-

ning versus end of semester), difficulty of interlist asso-

ciation (2, 4, or 10 filler syllables), and direction of

conditioning were all varied.
It was believed that subjects knowing about condition-

ing might be in

better position to respond to demand cues.

a

Likewise, it was felt that the addition of filler syllables

would make the pattern less obvious and so lead to less

conditioning with more filler items, and more conditioning
with less items.

Of course, number of conditioning trials

remained constant.

Following the conditioning procedure,

subjects filled out

a

17 question postexperimental ques-

tionnaire to assess contingency awareness and demand awareness.

Results showed

a

strong conditioning effect for all

subjects combined (p_^'.001),

effect (p_\.05),

ar.d

a

a

significant sophistication

significant effect for interlist

difficulty (£<.05).

Page found that the best predictor of

conditioning was demand awareness, not contingency awareness.

For subjects identified as contingency aware but not

demand aware, conditioning was not significant.
a

Page found

basically bimodal distribution on rating the syllables,

the demand aware subjects rating them strongly, the rest

rating them near the mid-point.

Staats (1969) replied to his critics, claiming these
results were "not crucial challenges to the author's learning
theory of attitudes, or to the experimental methods of the

author-"

For example, the bimodal distribution which Page

found could be due to some subjects who follow the instructions, and some who do not attend or engage in interfering

strategies.

The sophistication finding could be due to

later subjects being informed of the study by earlier subjects.

The addition of filler items not only makes the task

less obvious

,

but al so increases the boredom inherent in

the task and hence inattention .

A viable point raised by

Staats is that Page's questionnaire essentially programs
the subject into awareness.

Each question teaches the sub-

ject that he has been deceived, and that he should have

noticed
naire

a

rmay

pattern of associ at ion .
have

a

In a sense,

the quest ion-

demand characteristic of its own.

what subject likes to admit that he has been fooled?

cording to Staats,

if

the subject can recal

items he can figure out the "right" answer.

1

For
Ac-

just a few

Similarly,

16

in Cohen's study, an essential part of the question
Staats

used was dropped

periment."

— "while

you were participating in the ex-

Staats argues that simply rating the syllables

causes some subjects to become aware when they encounter
the question on awareness, even though they were not aware
at the time of rating.

At issue is whether subjects see a

pattern in the procedure and cooperate, or whether they are

conditioned and then the conditioning leads to awareness.
A subject successfully conditioned may not need much help
in becoming aware of why he likes a certain syllable.

Page (1974) carried out two studies in which he at-

tempted to manipulate aware subjects.

In the first study,

he used the Staats procedure up to the point of rating the

syllables.

The control group then continued in the Staats

procedure, but in the reversal group, Page asked subjects

who had "caught on" to the associations between the lists
to rate the syllables in the opposite direction to that

direction they were supposed to, but only for the two syllables for which subjects found a consistent pattern.

If

the subject was not aware of a pattern, he was to ignore the

instruction and rate the syllables according to his feelings.
Results showed

a

switch of conditioning direction in the

reversal group as compared to the control group, even though
both were conditioned in the same direction.

In the second

study, subjects were instructed to associate between the

slides and words,

cind

they showed

a

large increase in con-

17

ditioning.

in neither study above did Page carefully
examine

the contingency aware-demand unaware subjects as
compared to
the unaware subjects, but this turned out to be unnecessary

since only subjects who were demand aware exhibited conditioning.

Staats would probably criticize these studies for

reasons similar to those in his 1969 paper.

In the first

study, subjects are told more is going on than what they

may have been aware of, and they may then reflect and figure
out the source of their affect.

In the second study,

an

increased rate of awareness was correlated with increased

conditioning.

Staats is cognizant of this fact and tries to

remove aware subjects.
Recently, O'Donnell and Brown (1973) have studied the

classical conditioning of attitudes of children from
18.

8

to

Staats and Staats' general procedure was followed, and

demand and contingency awareness were assessed by means of
a

series of

open-ended guestions asked in

5

mental interview,,

a

post-experi-

It was found that contingency awareness

and not demand awareness was the best predictor of condi-

tioning scores, in agreement with Insko and Oakes (1966).

Also found was that increasing age was accompanied by increasing conditioning scores.

This finding may be due to

the difficulty younger children may experience in paying

attention to

a

boring task for

a

period of time.

Also, the

UCS words were not reported, but presumably they were the
same as those used by Staats and Staats (1957).

If so,

they

18

may have differing meanings and differing impacts
at different age levels.

The contingency awareness finding and the increasing
age association with greater conditioning may both
be re-

lated to the difficulty younger children may have in
telling
an adult experimenter in an oral interview that he was
mis-

led as to the purpose of the experiment.

So demand aware-

ness may possibly have accounted for the ratings better
than contingency awareness, but one can't tell because of

the nature of the assessment and the subject population.

Staats, et al.
the lines of Staats

(1972) have continued research along
1

earlier work.

Having extended his

theory of attitudes into what he terms atti tude-reinf orcer-

discriminative theory, he tested it by conditioning foodmeaning to

a

nonsense syllable.

Three nonsense syllables

were used, two paired with neutral words and one paired 12
of 16 trials with food'words.

with neutral words.

The other four trials were

As hypothesized, food-deprived subjects

rated the syllable more pleasantly than satiated subjects.

Two indirect questions were used to assess awareness, rather
than one as was previously done.

Again, of course,

a

demand

characteristic explanation is not eliminated because experimental subjects were told to refrain from eating and were

subsequently presented with food stimuli.
In a comparison of the effectiveness of the Staats,

Insko, and Oakes, and Page methods of assessing awareness,

19

Page (1971) found that the responses to the Page
question-

naire correlated most highly with conditioning.

Page charged

that the Staats question results in brief, ambiguous answers,
and that the subject may not accurately interpret the question.

The end result may be

a

number of false negatives

(awares scored as not aware) who could then account for con-

ditioning results.
Page (1973) compared the effectiveness of indirect,

direct and funnel questionnaires in separating aware and

unaware subjects.

Funnel questionnaires begin with indirect

questions and end with direct questions.

Assuming that

Staats' classical conditioning of attitudes results are me-

diated entirely by demand characteristics, he used conditioned subjects as

a

criterion group for awareness.

The

funnel questionnaire was found to be the most accurate in

identifying these individuals.

Unfortunately, the assump-

tion results in data not meaningful to those who disagree

with it.

If Staats' contention that some conditioned but

contingency unaware subjects are led to awareness by the

questionnaire is correct, then Page's results are not necessarily damaging.

Page's questionnaire could merely be the

most efficient in programming awareness.
In summary, then, there are three basic positions in

regard to what actually occurs in the classical conditioning
of attitudes procedure.

First is Staats' position that

automatic conditioning is occurring without awareness.

20

Classical conditioning of evaluative
meaning to a nonsense
syllable occurs through repeated pairings
with words having
a

common evaluative meaning component.

with

a

conditioned reflex, not

a

Staats is dealing

conscious concept.

Thus

the presentation of YOF , for instance,
comes to elicit

stronger and stronger evaluative meaning
responses over
conditioning trials.
Second is the position that contingency awareness
is
necessary for conditioning, but not demand
awareness. That
is, the subject gradually becomes aware
that a certain nonsense syllable is always followed by words of a
common

evaluative meaning.
stand for a concept.

The nonsense syllable thus comes to

Subjects aware of the concept will

therefore rate the syllable in the evaluative direction of
the concept, even without being aware of the demand
charac-

teristics.

The third position is that both contingency and demand

awareness are necessary.

Subjects must correctly form the

concept of evaluative meaning, and know that the experimenter
expects ratings of the syllables to be in accord with the

evaluative meaning.
The resolution of these three positions hinges on the

method of assessing awareness.

Staats claims his method is

efficient in identifying aware individuals, while Page's

questionnaire suggests awareness to the subjects.
argues that Staats* method results in

a

Page

'number of false

21

positives, and that these false
positives were just the ones
who were indeed conditioned. The
remaining unaware subjects
did not follow instructions, and
thus did not condition.
The present study dealt mainly with
the Staats and Page
positions, although the contingency-aware-only
subjects
were identified by utilizing Page's
assessment technique.
The purpose of the experiment reported
here was to give a
fair test to the two theoretical
positions of Staats and
Page, and to determine which of two
positions best fit the
data.

Three experimental and

a

control group were run.

The

direction of evaluative meaning conditioning was
made into
a

between-subjects variable because of the desire to
keep

the running of the experimental groups reasonably
short in

duration.

So the basic design was a

subjects design.

2

x 4

factorial between

The control group went through

a

procedure

that closely followed the Staats and Staats conditioning

procedure, with the only meaningful differences being the
use of one evaluative conditioned syllable in

a

cell of 72

rather than 108 total nonsense syllable-word pairings.

The

number of pairings of the syllable to be conditioned and

evaluative words was 18 as in Staats and Staats.

Following

the semantic differential ratings of the syllables and the

recall tests of words and syllables, subjects were given the

Staats question on awareness.
filled out

a

When they completed this they

modified form of the Page questionnaire.

It
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was expected that both the Staats
and Page findings would
be replicated in the control group.
That is, when subjects
judged aware on the basis of the Staats
question were removed, significant conditioning would
remain.
However,
when subjects judged contingency aware
or demand aware were
removed, no conditioning effect would remain.

The first experimental group was the
counterconditioning group.

Here the control group procedure was followed

except for the actual conditioning procedure
itself.

The

conditioning procedure was first done for the opposite
evaluative direction as in the control group, and then
repeated in the same direction as in the control group.

Sub-

jects rated on the semantic differential the conditioned

syllable based on their feelings during the second part.

According to Staats, it was expected that coun tercondi tioning would result in less conditioning than the control group
for unaware subjects.

-This is because of the r

pv

and

r

nv

(negative value) bonds tending to inhibit each other resulting in a washing out of the effect.
a

It is not known whether

primacy, recency or neutral effect would occur, but the

crucial point is that any conditioning would be weaker than
the control group.

Staats cites counterconditioning in

behavior therapy as "a verification of the classical conditioning theory of attitudes" (1969).

For Page's position, it would be expected that the
first time through

:he list would lead some subjects to
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awareness, who would then attend to
the second part because
they knew more is going on than
what they were informed,
in the second part, additional
subjects who were not aware
in the first part may see the
pattern, resulting in greater
conditioning. since Staats fails to
remove all the aware
subjects according to Page, then after
subjects aware on the
Staats question are taken, out, greater
conditioning should
remain in this group than in the control
group.

One possible problem with the counterconditioning
group
is that a phenomenon similar to the
reversal shift phenomenon found in operant studies (Kendler and
Kendler, 1969)
may result in

a

sudden swing from one direction of condi-

tioning to the other.

Then Staats and Page would have

identical predictions.

Although it is not clear that this

would happen, an experimental group was included to
avoid
any possibility of a reversal shift while still
testing the

above expectations.

In the concept formation group, sub-

jects first were conditioned in the same direction as in
the control group but with a filler syllable being condi-

tioned.

Then the target syllable was conditioned in the

second part in the same direction as the first part.

Ac-

cording to Staats, it was expected that this group would

condition to the same degree as the control group, or perhaps a little less due to possible conditioning of neutrality on the first part.

The demand characteristic position

would predict greater conditioning in the concept formation
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group than the control, for the same reason
as for the countercondi tioning group.

The third experimental group, labeled the
balance
group, again had two conditioning parts.

In the first part,

the nonsense syllables all had an equal number
of pairings

with evaluative words, thus validating the cover
story
since there was no pattern to be found.

In the second part,

the evaluative words were paired with the target
syllables.

The Staats position would predict little effect on conditioning so that the balance group should approximate the
control group.

However, the balanced presentation should

lower contingency awareness and therefore demand awareness,

resulting in less conditioning in the balanced group than
the control group, according to Page.

The strongest test

I

of these positions would be in comparing the balanced to

the counterconditioning group, since the predictions for the
two positions are diametrically opposed.

METHOD
Sub jects

The subjects were 164 undergraduates attending the

University of Massachusetts,

71

male and 93 female.

The

experiment was performed in the summer and fall of 1974,
with subjects receiving either course credit or payment of
$2 for participating in the experiment.

Both summer and

fall subjects who received course credit (127) were
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volunteers from the introductory psychology
classes.
Those who were paid were summer students
who volunteered
for the experiment (37).
The summer introductory psychology class was too small for purposes
of the experiment,
so paid subjects were solicited in
the summer.

Apparatus

Slides of nonsense syllables were made with onionskin paper and standard mounts.

The slides were projected

by means of a Kodak Carousel projector.

Procedure
In general, the procedure was as close as possible
to

that of Staats and Staats, except for experimental
manipu-

lations.

The Staats conditioning list was modified in

the following ways.

Since the experimental groups under-

went the conditioning procedure twice, and
ject rather than

a

a

between-sub-

within-subject design was employed, the

length of the conditioning presentation was cut from 108
trials to 72.

was preserved.

The 18 pairings of YOF with evaluative words
YOF, LA J

,

and QUG were each presented 18

times, while GIW and WUH were presented nine times each.

The rationale for using five syllables rather than three
or four, each with 18 pairings, was that on the basis of

pilot testing it was believed that three syllables resulted
in easy memorization of the syllables and then subjects

attended to the wcrds only, thus missing the contingency.
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On the other hand,

it was feared that excessively
long

conditioning sessions would lead to boredom
and again inattention, especially in the second
conditioning phase in
the experimental groups.

Thus

a

relatively short session

with five syllables to learn was thought
optimal to maintain attention while not causing boredom.

Subjects were run in groups of

3

to 11 in a classroom,

where they were seated individually at

a

desk or table.

The procedure for all groups was very similar,
so the control group procedure will be described first.

Subjects

read and signed an informed consent form, which
said they

would be engaged in

a

task of learning lists of nonsense

syllables and words, and also filling out questionnaires.

Subjects were then given the following instructions.
You are in an experiment concerning the effectiveness of two different types of learning.
One type is visual learning, the other type is
auditory learning. We want to know how both
these types of learning take place together the effect that one has on the other and so on.
I am going to show you a series of slides of
nonsense syllables, which are meaningless combinations of three letters. You are to watch
and try to remember them.
When they are over,
you will be asked to write down all the nonsense syllables you can recall.
Please relax
between the syllables and do not think of anything in particular.
Are there any questions?

The nonsense syllables VAF

,

XAD, VEC

,

YIM, and GAH

were then projected on the wall by the slide projector in
random order, with exposure set at five seconds each.

Each syllable was presented four times.

At the end of
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the presentation, subjects were asked to write down all

the nonsense syllables they could recall.

Then subjects were given the auditory learning task of
33 words presented one time each by the experimenter with

approximately two seconds between each word.
were instructed as

f ol

Subjects

lows*

am now going to say a series of words aloud,
one at a time. After I say a word, you are to
immediately repeat the word aloud, and then
continue to say the word to yourself until
the next word is said.
Following this, you
will be asked to write down all the words you
can recal 1 within 90 seconds.
I

The list of words used is presented in Appendix A.

After the presentation, subjects were asked to write down
all the words they could recall within 90 seconds.

they were given

a

Then

recognition task in which they circled

one of two words for

a

list of 12 pairs of words, depend-

ing on which word of the pair was presented (Appendix B).

Subjects were then given these instructions for the actual
conditioning.
We are now going to do both tasks together.
One list will be of nonsense syllables and
Here is the
the other will be of words.
procedure. First, you will see a nonsense
syllable on the wall. Then I will say a
word aloud. You are to repeat that word
aloud and then continue to repeat that word
silently until the next slide appears. You
can learn the syl 1 ables by just looking at them,
but
si nee each one wi 1 1 be shown many times
you should concentrate on saying the words aloud and to yourself, since there will be many
words, presented only once.
,

At this point

,

the subjects underwent conditioning.

.

Slides of nonsense syllables appeared for five
seconds.
One second after the slide appeared, the
experimenter

pro-

nounced

a

word.

The list for the positive evaluative

meaning conditioning control group is presented in
Table
Insert Table

Table

2

about here

1

provides the corresponding list for the nega-

tive evaluative meaning conditioning control group.

The

two lists differ only in that one list contains positive

evaluative words and the second contains negative evaluative words.

Insert Table

about here

2

Following the conditioning procedure, all subjects
were given a semantic differential rating booklet for the
five syllables used in the conditioning procedure and one

additional syllable not included.
sented on
scale.

a

1

page, along with

a

One syllable was pre-

pleasant-unpleasant rating

Subjects were given the following instruction.

We would now like to know how many syllables
you remember. At the same time, we would like
to know how you felt about each syllable since
it may have affected hew you learned the syllables.
Please rate the syllables based on how
you felt about them during the final learning
task

Subjects were told how to rate syllables on the semantic
differential scale-, and were instructed to circle the

s

.
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Table

1

Pairings for Positive Conditioning
1.

QUG-with

25. LAJ-leaf

49. YOF-hannv

2.

QUG-car

26. GlW-string

50. LA J — i n to

3.

GlW-pen

27. YOF-honest

51. QUG-shoe

4.

YOF-beauty

28. LAJ-and

52. YOF-prettv

5.

QUG-key

29. WUH-dot

6.

GlW-chair

30. YOF-smart

54. LAJ-cart

7.

YOF- joy

31. YOF-rich

55. QUG-wheel

8.

WUH-paper

32. QUG-line

56. WUH-on

9.

LAJ-cord

33. YOF-sacrea

57. QUG-dresser

10. YOF-gift

34. GlW-train

58. LAJ-trunk

11. LAJ-book

35. GlW-table

59. QUG-those

12. YOF-sweet

36. YOF-f riend

60. LAJ-fork

13. QUG-letter

37. WUH-can

61. LAJ-eight

14. QUG-ink

38. LAJ-word

62. WUH-note

15. WUH-radio

39. LAJ-pencil

63. YOF-healthy

40. QUG-clock

64. LAJ-stick

41. QUG-of

65. YOF — succes

42. YOF-valuable

66

19. QUG-pot

43. QUG-ship

67. YOF -money

20. WUH-the

44. GlW-room

68. QUG-six

21. LAJ-box

45. GlW-deck

69. YOF-vacation

22. WUH-clay

46. YOF -win

70. YOF-love

23. QUG-this

47. GlW-mop

71. LAJ-water

48. LAJ-glass

72.

16.

LAJ-f our

17. GIW-cup
18.

24.

QUG-f ive

LAJ-sand

'

53. QUG-glove

WUH-scck

LAJ-shirt

v

.

e
i 1

1

t
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Table
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•
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6.

2
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i
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i
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9.

T
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X
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T
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TUT
—
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-f s~\
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•
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&
0
D <c

•
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b3•
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19

•

QUG-pot

43. QUG-ship

67. YOF-f ear

20

•

WL'H-the

44. GlW-room

68. QUG-six

21

•

LAJ-box

45. GlW-deck

69. YOF-insane

22

•

46. YOF-sick

70. YOF-poison

23

•

WUH-clay
QUG-this

47. GlW-rnop

71. LAJ-water

24

•

LAJ-sand

48. LAJ-glass

72.

LAJ-shirt
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syllable if it was one presented during the final
learning
task.

Next was the word recall test, in which subjects

wrote down all the words they could recall within the
allotted
90 seconds.

This was followed by the word recognition test,

in which subjects again circled one word of a pair of
words

for 12 pairs (Appendix C).

At this point subjects were asked to fill out

a

sheet

of paper with the Staats awareness question at the top -

"Would you write down anything you thought about the experiment, especially anything you thought about the purpose of
the experiment, while you were participating in the experi-

ment."

Subjects were allowed to write as long as they

wished on this measure.

When all subjects in

a

group

finished writing, the Page questionnaire for assessing awareness was given to the subjects.

The questionnaire was

modified in order to make it applicable to

a

between-sub-

ject design and so it was comprehensible to control and

experimental groups.

Appendix
booklet.

D.

The modified version is found in

Each question was on

a

separate page of

a

small

After finishing the Page questionnaire, subjects

were debriefed individually and excused.
The experimental groups all contained the entire control group procedure, but in addition each also had a dif-

ferent conditioning phase that preceded the conditioning

procedure found in the control group.

For example, the

positive counterccndi tioning group (corresponding to the
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positive control group) followed the control procedure
up
to and including the conditioning instructions,
and then

underwent conditioning as in Table

2.

As can be seen, the

first conditioning phase was negative conditioning.

Fol-

lowing this negative conditioning, subjects were asked
to

write down all the nonsense syllables they could recall.
Then they wrote down all the words they could recall within 90 seconds.

Finally,

a

recognition test of 12 word

pairs was given (Appendix C).

Then the subjects were -given

the following instructions.

We are now going to do the final learning task.
We wish to measure not only the effect of learning two lists simultaneously, but also the improvement rates from going through the lists a
second time. Again, just look at the syllables,
but concentrate on saying the word I say aloud and
to yourself until the next slide appears.

From this point, the procedure was identical to that
of the positive evaluative conditioning control group.

The subjects were then given the conditioning procedure
again,, with the difference of positive evaluative meaning

words replacing the negative evaluative words.

The nega-

tive counterconditioning group simply had the order of the

two lists reversed.

The concept formation group manipulation that preceded
the regular conditioning phase was the pairing of QUG with

evaluative words, while YOF was paired with neutral words.
For the positive concept formation group QUG was paired
with positive worcs, and for the negative concept forma-
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ticn group QUG was paired with negative words.

Again, re-

call and recognition tests were given, followed
by the in-

structions for the "final learning task."
For the balanced group, all five syllables received
an equal proportion of pairings with evaluative
words,

randomly determined as to placement.

Again, this condi-

tioning phase was followed by the recall and recognition
tests and by the instructions for the "final learning task."

Judging
The answers to the two questionnaires were judged for

awareness by two undergraduates trained by the experimenter
and who were paid for their efforts.

The judges were first

given just the Staats question sheets and at no time saw
the semantic differential ratings.

Answers to the Staats

question were judged as evidencing contingency awareness
or no awareness.

Contingency awareness was scored as being

aware that YOF was paired with one or more pleasant (or

unpleasant) words.
The Page questionnaire scoring followed
lines in Page (1969).

the guide-

However, judges included the answer

to the Staats question in the Page questionnaire.

Judges

had scored all the Staats answers before beginning the

Page questionnaire.

They were told that it was perfectly

acceptable to change their scoring on awareness for the
Page questionnaire since they had additional information.
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Questionnaires were scored for contingency awareness and
for demand awareness.

To be scored demand aware,

a

sub-

ject had to be contingency aware and to know that this

contingency should influence the rating on the semantic
differential.

Subjects who were demand aware were also

scored on cooperation-resistance in relation to cooperating

with the experimental demand.

All three judgments were

made on the four-point scale used by Page.

For both aware-

ness measures, ratings were clearly aware, probably aware,

probably unaware, and clearly unaware.

Analogous designa-

tions were used for the cooperation-resistance measure.

RESULTS

Reliability
The initial ratings of awareness on the Staats question by the judges were correlated, with
son product-moment

r_

of .96.

a

resulting Pear-

Judges disagreed on only one

of 164 subjects, and this subject was subsequently scored
as aware by a third judge.

Twelve subjects were scored as

aware and 152 as unaware.
Next the reliability was computed for the Page ques-

tionnaire on contingency awareness, with an
sulting.

r_

of .82 re-

Subjects who were classified by one judge as

either clearly aware or probably aware and by the other
judge as clearly or probably unaware were reclassified by
the judges in a meeting in which they reconsidered their
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initial judgments.

Eleven subjects were reclassified in

this way, resulting in

aware subjects.

21

contingency aware and 143 un-

This procedure was also done for the de-

mand awareness and cooperation-resistance measures.
reliability for the demand aware judgments was

r

=

The
.74,

with disagreement as to the dichotomy demand aware-unaware
on nine subjects.

Fifteen subjects were found demand aware

and 149 were not.

Of the demand aware subjects nine were

scored as cooperators and five as resistors, based primarily
on self-ratings of the subject on the Page guestionnaire.

Initial Analyses

Because of the season (summer/fall) variable and the

payment (money/credit) variable being added to the original
design, it was thought useful to eliminate these variables
if

possible in order to increase sample sizes within cells.

The effect of these factors were separately examined in
terms of two dependent variables, semantic differential

ratings and awareness scores.

For the semantic differen-

tial ratings, mean scores were calculated for each cell in

the two control and six experimental groups.

Neither the

season nor the payment factor was significant, althcugh
it was impossible to check for interactions because of

empty cells.

No consistent pattern could be found, how-

ever, that would indicate a possible interaction.

Simi-

larly, no effects were evident on the Staats awareness

classification or the Page contingency awareness classifi-
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cation.

Because of these results, the season and
payment

variables were dropped from the analysis.

Variables that

were included in subsequent analyses were sex,
experimental group, direction of conditioning and
awareness.

Semantic Differential Ratings
A

2

x

2

x 4

(Direction

x

Sex

x

Group) analysis of

variance was performed on all subjects
semantic differential rating.

Overall,

(N =
a

ference was found for direction (F(l,148)
as shown in Table 3.
A second

2x2x4

164)

for the

significant dif= 6.50,

£<.025),

No other effects were significant.

analysis of variance was then done after

the 12 subjects who were scored as aware on the Staats

question were removed.

The direction effect disappeared,

and again no other effect was significant.

A third analysis

of variance was carried out after the 21 subjects who were

contingency aware on the Page questionnaire were removed
(of the Staats-aware subjects, one was scored as not being

contingency aware on the Page questionnaire and was reentered into the analysis).
found.

No significant differences were

Finally, an analysis of variance was performed on

the subjects who were not demand aware on the basis of the

Page questionnaire.

Seven subjects who were contingency

aware but not demand aware were re-entered for this analysis.

Again, no significant differences were found.

Insert Table

3

about here
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Table

3

Summary of the Analysis of Variance Performed on
Two Directions of Conditioning, Two Sexes, and Four Groups

Source

df

Direction (A)

MS

F

1

23.70

6.50*

Sex (B)

1

1.76

.48

Group (C)

3

3.41

.93

A x B

1

.095

.08

A x C

3

1.911

.52

B x C

3

2.83

.77

A x 3 x C

3

1.69

.46

Error
*

£ <.05

148

The above analyses were done on subjects on the basis
of various definitions of being unaware.

That is, after

the initial analysis of variance, Staats-aware subjects

were removed, and then Page contingency aware subjects
were removed.

It was impossible to perform the same analy-

sis of variance on aware subjects because of very small

numbers per cell.

However, means for all groups of aware

and unaware subjects are shown in Table 4.

The row head-

ings list the groups, while the column headings present
the various classifications of the subjects on the basis
of awareness.

The cells contain the mean semantic dif-

ferential ratings along with the N.

The far left column

presents the cell means for all subjects in the eight groups
Since a significant difference was found only for all subjects, contrasts between group means were performed to de-

termine the source of the difference.

The control group

contrast was marginally significant (Fy(l,148)

=

3.29,

p_<.3.0), as was the contrast for the countercondi tioning

group (Fr(l,148)

=

2.95,

£<.10).

The contrast for the

concept formation group was non-significant, as was the

contrast for the balanced group.

So no group contrast was

responsible for the overall directional effect, but there
was

a

trend for most of the difference between pleasant

and unpleasant cells to be in the control and countercon-

ditioning groups.
tion,

All groups were in the predicted direc-

however, anc so contributed to the overall effect.
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Insert Table
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about here

In examining the Staats-aware column
of Table 4, it

can be seen why the significant direction
effect vanished
upon removal of these subjects.
In general, the Staats
aware subjects show extreme conditioning,
and their removal

attenuates the mean differences for the Staats
unaware group
However, the group means are still all in the
predicted

direction of pleasant groups having lower mean
scores than
the unpleasant groups.

The Page contingency aware subjects

again show strong conditioning, while their removal
results
in virtually no difference in cell means.

Obviously,

there was no significant difference between the Staats-

awareness cell means, but the directional patterns between
cells was always in the right direction.

The Page demand

aware subjects, as expected, showed consistent strong con-

ditioning.

Of interest here is that when the six subjects

who were contingency aware but demand unaware were included
in the Page demand unaware column,

the consistent direc-

tional pattern re-emerged.

These six subjects were examined separately to see how
strongly they conditioned and to see how clearly they were
not demand aware.

Of the six subjects, two were from the

pleasant control group, one from the unpleasant control
group, one was from the pleasant balanced group, and two

were from the unpleasant balanced group.

The semantic
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differential scores of the subjects in the unpleasant con-

ditions were subtracted from eight to obtain

conditioning score.

a

That is, for all subjects

one indicated strong conditioning.

corrected
a

score of

The mean corrected

conditioning score for all six subjects was 1.67, due to
the most extreme ratings by all but one subject.

All but

one subject was rated as unaware on the Staats question,
and all received ratings of clearly aware on the Page con-

tingency awareness measure (X

=

1.0).

Mean ratings on the

demand awareness measure for these subjects was 3.75,
toward the clearly unaware end of the scale.

In summary,

these six subjects showed very strong conditioning, were
not identified as aware by the Staats question, were all

rated as clearly contingency aware on the basis of the
Page questionnaire, but were not demand aware.

The 14 demand aware subjects were initially classified by judges on

a

For purposes of

t-test between cooperators and resistors,

a

4-point scale of cooperation-resistance.

and because of the small size of the group, it was neces-

sary to reduce the four categories to two (cooperators
and resistors).

resistors.

This resulted in nine cooperators and five

The semantic differential scores again were

corrected for direction of conditioning, and

a

significant

difference was found between the cooperators and resistors
on the one-tailed _t-test (_t(12)

=

1.92,

£

<.05).

The ef-

fect was in the expected direction but was surprisingly
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weak, perhaps partially because of the small
sample size.

Awareness

Another dependent variable that was examined was
awareness.

A

2

x 4

(Direction

x

Group) analysis of variance

was carried out on the Page contingency awareness
ratings
on the 4 point scale.

No significant effects were found.

No analysis of variance was done on the Staats aware-

ness data since only a two point scale was used in scoring and only 12 subjects of 164 were aware, resulting in
a

grossly skewed distribution.

However, a chi-square test

for frequency of awareness among the four groups was at-

tempted after collapsing across direction of conditioning to increase the N.

No significant difference was found,

although according to Siegel (1956) the assumptions of the
test were grossly violated since 50% of the expected values

were under five.

Twenty percent under five is the upper

limit of the test.
A similar aware/unaware by group chi-square was com-

puted for the Page contingency aware data.

It was expected

that certain groups should have greater awareness than

others.

For example, the balanced group was designed to

inhibit contingency awareness, while the counterconditioning and concept formation groups were meant to enhance it.
No difference in frequency of awareness was found between

qroups, but again the expected values assumption was vio-

lated with two of the eight cells
having expected values
under five.

Because of the assumption violations in
these two
cases, it was decided to combine the
countercondi tioning
and concept formation groups in order
2
to conduct
the

test properly.

When this was done for the Staats awareness

data, 17% of the expected values were under
five.
no significant effect was discovered.

gency measure,

£<.10), with

x

a

Again,

For the Page contin-

weak effect was found (x 2 (2)

=

5.73,.

no expected value less than five.

This ten-

dency was due mainly to the disparity between the
expected
and observed values for the control group, with

a

greater

frequency of aware subjects observed in this group than
expected.

Correlational Analysis
The semantic differential ratings, Staats awareness
scores, Page contingency awareness scores and Page demand

awareness scores were

intercorrelated by means of Pearson

product-moment correlations after correcting the conditioning scores.

The results are shown in Table

lations were highly significant.

5.

All corre-

The semantic differential

ratings correlated most highly with the Page contingency

awareness measure, next most with the Page demand awareness
measure, followed by the Staats awareness question.

This

ordering of correlations was checked for significance by
means of _t-tests, and the following results were obtained.

44

Insert Table

5

about here

The semantic differential ratings' correlation
with
the Staats item (.23) was significantly lower
than its

correlation with the Page contingency awareness measure

(tU61)

=

2.55,

£<.02).

Similarly, the correlation of

the semantic differential ratings with the demand aware-

ness measure (.29) was significantly lower than the correlation with the contingency awareness measure (t(161)
2.15,

£<

.05).

=

The correlation of the semantic differen-

tial ratings with the Staats item was not significantly

different from the correlation of the semantic differential ratings with the demand awareness measure.

Thus,

contingency awareness is more highly correlated with the
semantic differential ratings than either the Staats awareness item or demand awareness.

The intercorrelations of the Staats awareness item
and contingency and demand awareness scores are very high,
as would be expected since all are measuring the same or

similar things.

The contingency awareness/demand aware-

ness correlation of .80 is due to the fact that by definition all demand aware subjects are contingency aware, and
all but six contingency aware subjects were scored as being

demand aware.

More interesting is the relation between the

Staats awareness item, and the contingency and demand aware
ness measures.

Both correlations are quite high (.64 and
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Table

5

Summary of Correlations Among Four Variables

2

Semantic differential
ratings
S taats

.23*

3

4

.39*

.29*

.46*

.

wareness

ratings
Page contingency awareness ratings

72*

.80*

Page demand awareness
ratines

*

£<

.001
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.72), but it was unexpected that the direction
of the ordering of the correlations would be with

demand awareness cor-

relating more highly with the Staats measure
than contingency awareness. After all, the Staats item
was designed
to assess contingency awareness,

not demand awareness.

To check the possibility of the difference
between the cor-

relations being significant,

a

t-test was performed.

it

was found that the Staats awareness measure was
signifi-

cantly more highly correlated with demand awareness than
with the Page contingency awareness measure
2.23, rjC.05).

factors.

(_t(161)

=

This effect could be accounted for by two

First, the Page contingency awareness measure

picked up more subjects as aware than did the Staats assessment.

The aemand aware group was comparable in size to the

Staats aware group.

Secondly, it was precisely those sub-

jects that the Staats measure did not score as aware that

were found as contingency aware but not demand aware.

It

will be recalled that of these six subjects, five were

scored as unaware by the Staats assessment, and all were

scored as unaware of the experimental demand.
Recall Test Analysis

After the data were collected and analyzed,

it was

decided to also check the relation of the corrected conditioning score to the recall of words.

It was thought that

this analysis might possibly shed some light on the failure
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to replicate the results of Staats and
Page.

An inverse

relation between number of words recalled and the
degree
of conditioning might indicate inattention on
the part of

the subjects to the slides.

Perhaps they quickly learned

the syllables and then mainly listened to the
words, thus

missing the contingency.

A positive relation could best

be interpreted as demonstrating attention, and then
"catching on" in Page's viewpoint or conditioning in
Staats*

view.

Analysis was done by counting the number of words

correctly recalled after the conditioning procedure for
the control groups.

For the experimental groups, the score

was taken from the number of words correctly recalled after
the first conditioning phase.

This was done because in this

way all subjects had had only one time through the list.
Results of the Pearson correlation were not significant
(£

=

.07), and are best viewed in terms of the crude nature

of the

recall measure.

Certainly many variables contri-

bute to the number of words correctly recalled other than

attention.

In terms of Page's model,

it is

the affective

words that matter, and even here only one or two words

necessarily are learned in order to become contingency
aware.
fact,

In Staats'

theory, no relation is necessary.

In

those who follow instructions best won't rehearse

previous words during the presentation of

a

new slide.

Thus, little learning of words would be expected.
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Boredom Self-Ratings
To examine the possible role of boredom in the experi-

mental results, the answers to the final question added
to
the Page questionnaire (Appendix D) was used to compute

cell means.

The question was "How did you feel during

the experiment?", and subjects rated themselves on a 7-

point scale from very bored to very interested.

For the

positive conditioning groups, no pattern was evident, but
for the negative conditioning groups, the control group

was significantly less bored than the experimental groups
(t_(74)

=

2.11,

£<.05).

It is not clear why a directional

difference should emerge, rather than

a

main effect for

control groups versus experimental groups.

If this dif-

ference in rated boredom for the negative conditioned
groups was meaningful, it should have had some impact on

conditioning scores or contingency awareness.

Thus,

a

group by direction interaction would be expected for all

subjects if, for example, boredom was mediating attention.
No such interaction was found for any grouping of semantic

differential ratings based on awareness, nor for the contingency awareness analysis of variance.

This would seem

to rule cut boredom as an important factor in the results,

although it does not necessarily rule out attention, which
was not assessed directly.

DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment were generally
inconclusive, because the control group failed to replicate
Staats'

(1957)

results, and the manipulations failed to

have their intended effects.
lem,

In terms of the first prob-

the mean semantic differential ratings for the two

control groups did not differ significantly after removal
of the subjects classified aware on the basis of Staats'

criterion.

Even before their removal, with all subjects

entered, the control groups differed only marginally
(p_<.10).

In this way, the control groups also failed

to replicate the results of Page (1969).
ell

It is only when

subjects for all groups are entered into the analysis

of variance that a significant direction effect emerges,

but it is still less powerful than the results obtained by
Page.

The second problem is related to the first.

The coun-

terconditioning and concept formation groups were intended
to increase contingency awareness and demand awareness,

while the balanced group was designed to decrease contingency awareness.

That they did not have these effects is

evidenced by the analysis of variance for the Page contin2

gency awareness scores, by the

x

Staats awareness among groups

and the analogous

Page contingency awareness*

,

test for frequency of

In the last test,

a

x

2

for

weak
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tendency

(

£ <.10> was

found for the control group to have

higher frequency of contingency awareness
than did the
experimental groups.
a

This result, along with the marginal result
of the
control groups contrast for the initial analysis
of

variance, might provide grounds for explaining
the incon-

clusive results.

Of course, as in all post-hoc explana-

tions, speculation, must be labeled as just that
unless

supported by evidence.

I

If the interpretation can be made

that the control group is both conditioning

a

bit more and

becoming contingency aware more than the other groups,
then two causes for this tendency can be suggested.

First, the control group conditioning procedure was shorter
than the experimental groups procedure.

While the control

group had 72 word-slide pairings, the experimental groups
had 144.

Staats and Page used 108 pairings.

Thus, if

longer slide presentations led to inattention, less condi-

tioning would have been expected in the experimental groups,

especially since this inattention would have been greatest

during the crucial second time through the conditioning
procedure.

Of course, this factor alone would lead one

to expect greater conditioning in the control group than
in the Staats and Page studies.

Reasons why this did not

occur are discussed below.
A second possibility is related to the fact that con-

trol subjects were generally run early in the experiment,
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while the experimental subjects were usually
run later.
It is possible that the experimenter
displayed greater

enthusiasm or expressiveness during the early
sessions,
or conversely, more boredom later in the
course of the ex-

periment.

In either case, one could again postulate
greater

attention in the control group.

Staats (1969) observed that

pronouncing the positive UCS words in

a

positive manner and

the negative UCS words in a negative manner led
to greater-

conditioning and awareness, although it is not known if
this effect extends to general expressiveness.

For both

of these possible explanations of results, the boredom

data do not support the role of attention although no direct

measure of attention was used.
If the lack of significant conditioning in this ex-

periment was not due to boredom leading to inattention,
then the possibility exists that many subjects who were

truly conditioned were being misclassif ied as aware and
thus removed from the conditioning analyses.

But a compari-

son of awareness rates across attitude conditioning studies

reveals that the present study has

a

clearly lower rate of

awareness than other studies, as shown in Table 6.

The

columns list the different methods of classifying subjects
as aware in the past, either by Staats'

general measure of

awareness, contingency awareness (omitting demand aware
subjects), demand awareness, or combined contingency and

demand awareness.

In every category,

the present study
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has the lowest rate of awareness,
especially so in demand
awareness.
If too many false positives
accounts for a lack
of replication and a lack of
experimental effects, then a

higher rather than
pected.

a

lower rate of awareness would be ex-

Since the rate of awareness in this study
is con-

sistently lower, it seems unlikely that
conditioned subjects are being miscl assif ied.
So if subjects are

not in-

correctly being found aware, and are not
conditioning,
then the conditioning procedure is having
little effect.
Insert Table

about here

6

A possible reason for this is that one difference between the present control group procedure and the
usual

Staats and Staats procedure is that this experiment used
direction of conditioning as

a

between-sub j ects variable

while most other studies used it as
able.

a

within-sub jects vari-

Thus, Staats and Staats (1957, 1958), Page (1969),

Cohen (1964), and O'Donnell and Brown (1973) used
subjects design.

Other studies using

a

a

within-

between subjects

design differed in important respects from the present
study.

For example, Staats, Staats, and Crawford (1962),

as described above, used a procedure conducive to producing

contingency awareness.

Insko and Oakes (19G6) used only

three nonsense syllables, each with 18 pairings, while the

present study used five.

Thus it may be argued that the

contrast between pleasant and unpleasant words within the
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Table

6

Percentage of Aware Subjects in Various

Classifications in Various Studies

Staats
Method %

Contingency
Aware %

Demand
Aware %

Total
Aware %

oLdaLo ailQ
Staats '57

10

10

Staats and
Staats '58

18

18

54*

54

Cohen
•64

Insko and
Oakes '66
Pa <3 e

King

•

**

,

69

7
f

8

45

53

6

32

39

4

9

7

or 13**

Modified Staats question used
Total Staats assessed awareness and total Page assessed
awareness, respectively
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conditioning session increases the salience
of the pleasantness dimension, thereby increasing the
ease of becoming contingency aware.
While this factor may serve to increase awareness, it is doubtful that this
should have any
effect on unaware conditioning.
In spite of the general low level of awareness,
sub-

jects did become aware to differing extents
and so the

correlational results of the corrected semantic differential ratings and the various measures of awareness
deserve

discussion.

As expected, conditioning was found to be

highly correlated with awareness.

It was not expected,

however, that contingency awareness would be the best

predictor of conditioning scores.

This result is directly

opposed to Page's correlational results, where demand
awareness was found to be the best predictor.

Indeed,

Page's contingency aware/demand unaware subjects failed to

exhibit conditioning.

In contrast,

in the present study

the six contingency aware/demand unaware subjects showed

strong conditioning.

They were also judged fairly strongly

as being contingency aware but not demand aware.

Thus,

in this experiment it must be concluded that demand aware-

ness is not necessary for conditioning to occur, contrary
to Page's conclusions.

These results for contingency

awareness are quite in line with those of Insko and Oakes,
but these experimenters found a correlation of essentially

zero between demard awareness and conditioning.

The
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difference between their study and the present one
as well
as Page's results could be due to their scoring
demand
awareness on

a

aware than

naive subject even for an incorrect hypothesis,

a

continuum where

a

subject was scored as more

and to the use of an oral interview which could
conceivably

inhibit the revelation of the hypothesis.

They also failed

to separate resistors and cooperators in their analysis

of demand awareness.
An interesting finding was that classification of sub-

jects

on.

the basis of the Staats item was more highly cor-

related with demand awareness than contingency awareness.

This may be explained by assuming that those subjects who
are demand aware will be most likely to be concerned with

the contingency.

If they know the contingency should in-

fluence their ratings, then the contingency is fairly salient.

If they are only contingency aware, they may fail

to mention the fact on their answer to the Staats item since
it is not salient to them.

After all, they are not aware

of any relation of the contingency to any other part of

the experiment, and so may fail to mention it in their ans-

wer to the Staats item.

It will be recalled that five of

the six contingency aware subjects were not scored as such

by the Staats question.

Since they were not asked directly

about an irrelevant fact (the contingency), it was not men-

tioned in their answer.
If we assume that the lack of a contrast was responsible
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for

general lowered level of awareness, then the failure

a

to obtain conditioning after Staats-aware subjects
were

removed may be due to

experiment.

a

factor possibly peculiar to this

The subjects in this experiment were given the

Staats question and then were not given or informed about
the Page questionnaire until all had finished answering it.

Since subjects were run in small groups and were therefore
in close visual contact with the experimenter,

they may have

felt an implicit demand to continue writing, since they may

have concluded the experiment was over, but were not allowed
to leave.

If so, more aware subjects would be likely to

write something that would identify them as such, and result
in the disappearance of the conditioning effect.

Since none of the hypotheses could be adequately tested
in this study,

the results can be interpreted in terms of

any of the three positions on awareness.

In Staats' case,

this means 164 subjects were given the conditioning proce-

dure, but very few, if any, conditioned without becoming

aware.

That those who did become aware, rated the nonsense

syllable in the direction of the conditioning, is hot harmful

to his position.

Failure to achieve conditioning with-

out awareness here does not disprove Staats' hypothesis,
but when coupled with the other studies cited, it seems

damaging.

It seems at best that unaware conditioning is

closely tied to becoming aware.

When postexperimental

questioning more extensive than Staats'* is used, no

conditioning is found without awareness.

If subjects

condition and then become aware during the postexperimental
inquiry, then very few subjects condition without awareness who do not figure out the contingency and perhaps the

demand at that time.

One wonders where the subjects are

who condition without awareness, but are unable to deduce
the source of their evaluative response during the inquiry.

This type of subject is lacking in all but Staats' own
studies.

It is quite possible that automatic conditioning

of evaluative response can occur, but it either creates

awareness or leads to the threshold of awareness.
all, we are dealing with a verbal stimulus and

a

After
verbal

reinforcer, and awareness is closely linked with the verbal
system.

The demand aware position is damaged in that it was
found that conditioning can occur without demand awareness.

Certainly being aware of the experimental demand did not
harm conditioning, but it was not as good
cond;. tioning as

contingency awareness.

a

predictor of

Indeed, some of

those demand aware mav resist the demand and thus fail to

show cond i tioning .

The di f f erence between cooper a tors and

resistors in this study was weak

,

especial ly since subjects

can look back at their semantic di f f erential rating and re-

troactively decide whether they cooperated or resisted.
The most parsimonious explanation of the data was in
terms of contingency awareness

,

based on the correlational
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analysis.

Some subjects became aware of the
relation between the words and syllables and rated
them accordingly
because of the concept they came to stand
for.
it is guite
possible, however, that these subjects were
conditioned
to awareness.

The present experiment cannot distinguish

between this possibility and the position that
learning
took place at a more cognitive level.
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Appendix A

Brief

Large
Blue
Stool

Shingle
Blanket

Supper
Tree
Belt

Outside

Hammer
Lawyer

Highway
Overcoat
Movie
Forward
Backpack

Underground
Elephant
Shirt
Run

Motor
Apple
Street
Card
Ocean
Dog

Cotton
Black

Storeroom
Vil laqe

Tape

Switch
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Appendix B

CIRCLE ONE OF EACH PAIR
BRIEF OR BRIEFCASE

LARGE OR SMALL
OVER OR OVERCOAT

CAT OR DOG
RUN OR WALK

STORE OR STOREROOM

UNDER OR UNDERGROUND
OUT OR OUTSIDE

BLACK OR BLACKBOARD

VILLAGE OR TOWN

SUPPER OR DINNER
HIGH OR HIGHWAY
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Appendix C

I

CIRCLE ONE OF EACH PAIR

WATER OR WATERFALL
DRESS OR DRESSER

LEAF OR LEAFLET

STICK OR TWIG
INK OR INKWELL

BLOUSE OR SHIRT

GLASS OR MUG

RAILROAD OR TRAIN
KETTLE OR POT
MUD OR SAND
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Appendix D

Modified Page Questionnaire
I.

What was the purpose of this experiment and
what were
you supposed to do?
you ever have the idea that
its purpose might be something other than
what I was
telling you? What?

3.

Thinking back to the experiment, did you notice
at the
time any relationship between certain syllables
on the
screen and the words that were spoken?

4.

If you noticed any relationship between the
lists, is
this something you were actually aware of during the
experiment or is it something you thought of while
filling out these questions?

5.

Do you remember approximately when it was that you
noticed this? Describe the point in the experiment
at which this occurred.

6.

What did you think was the purpose of the rating scales
at the time you were filling them out, if anything?

7.

How did you go about deciding what rating to give the
various nonsense syllables?

8.

Did you think that the experimenter might have expected
that you would rate certain of the nonsense syllables
in any certain way?
Explain.

9.

Was your answer to Question 8 something you were actually aware of before or during the marking of the rating
scales, or something you thought of afterwards?

10.

In the final

learning task, what syllable was always
or usually paired with the travel words?
a.

How certain are you of this or are you guessing?
Guessing
Certain
:

b.

:

:

:

:

:

Is this something you were aware of during the
experiment or something you thought of since?
Please explain if necessary.
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11.

In the final

learning task, what syllable was always
or
Y
usually paired with words of pleasant
meaning?
a.

How certain are you of this or are you
guessing?
Guessing
Certain
:

b.

12.

:

:

:

:

:

Is this something you were aware of
during the
experiment or something you thought of sinr-e?
Please explain if necessary.

in the final

learning task, what syllable was always
or usually paired words of unpleasant meaning?
a.

How certain are you of this or are you guessing?
Guessing
Certain
:

:

b.

:

.

.

.

Is this something you thought of during the
experiment or something you thought of since?

Please explain if necessary.

13.

Were you ever aware during the experiment that during

the final learning task, YOF was always paired with
words of unpleasant meaning or conotation?
And, if so, were you aware of any effect this might
have had on you as you marked the rating scales?
Explain.
14.

Assuming that you knew the unpleasant word and what was
expected on the marking of the rating scales, rate your
attitude while marking the rating scales.
Resist the
influence

:

"j

:

:

:

Mark the
right answers

;

15.

Please make any other comments that you feel might help
us understand your reaction to this experiment.

16.

Have you had any previous courses in psychology such
as in high school?
Have you had introductory psychology in college?

17.

Do you know the meaning of the term conditioning?
If so, did you think about it during the experiment?

18.

How did you feel during the experiment?

Very interested

:

:

:

:

:

;

Very bored

